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Singapore’s Regionalization Blueprint:  
A Case for Transnational State Enterprise Networks? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Singapore’s regionalization stratagem has led to the establishment of industrial parks in China, India and several 
Southeast Asian nations.  The strategic intent behind these overseas projects was two-fold: firstly, to export 
Singapore’s comparative advantages in fields such as management know-how, technological capabilities and a 
corrupt-free administration to regions where such factors are lacking; secondly, to exploit the location advantages 
that each region offers.  This paper presents empirical findings of the industrial parks in China, Vietnam and India, 
and provides an insight to the strategies and constraints of the state-led initiatives.  Our study concludes that while 
the calculated and schematized efforts have indeed been remarkable in the attempt to create industrial enclaves in 
Asia, Singapore has not fully taken into account the intricacies of economic and socio-political realities in the hosts’ 
environments. 
 
Key words: Industrial Parks – Investment Enclaves - Singapore 
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Literature Review 
Porter (1998) emphasizes the importance of location as a competitive advantage in an increasingly complex, 
dynamic and knowledge-based economy, which is evident from cluster prevalence (Porter 2000a).  Although the 
traditional roles of location may have been undermined to some extent due to advances in technology which 
encompasses easier access to inputs and natural factor endowments, location remains vital on account of 
agglomeration and cluster benefits. Krugman (1991) and Peck (1996) have reasoned that these benefits include 
important linkages and complementarities, efficient infrastructure and specialized labor as well as knowledge 
spillovers. 
 
On a separate note, Dunning’s (1980, 1988, 2001) eclectic paradigm sought to provide the analytical basis for 
explaining the activities of firms situated beyond their national boundaries. The OLI paradigm explained the ability 
and willingness of firms to serve markets, and examined the reasons for their choice of exploiting this advantage 
through foreign production rather than domestic production, exports or portfolio resource flows through the 
interaction of Ownership-specific (O) advantages, Location-specific (L) advantages, and Internalization-incentive (I) 
advantages. The paradigm was reconfigured to constitute the ‘asset-augmenting’ aspects of FDI and MNC activity. 
For instance, O-advantages have been separated into static and dynamic - static advantages describing the 
advantages possessed by a firm that generate income at a particular point of time and dynamic advantages 
illustrating the proprietary factors which permit a firm to boost its incoming-generating assets over time. 
 
Dunning (1998a), Porter (1998), and others (e.g. Jovanovic 2003) have reiterated the importance of the spatial 
dimension, such as location-advantages, as affecting the competitiveness of investing firms. The strategic choice of 
firms’ locations reflects twin aims - to not only transfer their resources to the host countries, but also to gain access 
to the available strategic assets (Chen and Chen 1998, Makino and Delios 1996). Like O-advantages, L-advantages 
can also be classified as static and dynamic. While an industrial township facilitates companies’ resource-dependent 
operations with its static L-advantages, the geographical concentration of such activity also engenders dynamic L-
advantages such as asset-augmenting activities (e.g. R&D) and agglomeration benefits. Given their deeply 
entrenched sources, these dynamic L-advantages cannot be easily replicated elsewhere.  Markusen (1996) also 
points out that although firms may relocate knowledge and similar assets, assets with a public good or collective 
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characteristic cannot be easily moved. Transactional benefits of spatial proximity of firms are significant, especially 
for cases where transaction costs of traversing distances are high (Storper and Scott 1995, Dunning 1998b). As 
firms’ core competencies become increasingly knowledge-intensive, the place in which firms locate their 
production, organization and use of assets emerges as a critical competitive advantage.  
 
The roles of governments in advancing the competitiveness of a country or region within a country need to be 
altered accordingly, as the importance of created assets supersedes that of natural factor endowments as a key 
determinant of location (Dunning 1995, 1997a). Dunning (1997b). Stopford (1999) and Porter (2000b) also argue 
that governments need to ensure that the availability, quality and cost effectiveness of general purpose inputs have to 
match up to the standards of their global competitors, as well as create and sustain an institutional framework and 
ethos.  This is to facilitate a continuous upgrading of the resources and capabilities within its jurisdiction, and to 
expedite, rather than impede, micro-regional clusters development and upgrading. 
 
Singapore’s industrial township projects in China, Vietnam and India represent collaborative efforts by the 
Singapore and respective local governments to create location-bound advantages within more uncertain 
environments, through a propitious combination of cost-effective factors of production, efficient infrastructure and 
management expertise; i.e., supplementing natural location-specific advantages with engineered ones to attract 
foreign direct investments to the parks. 
 
This paper investigates how the purported advantages measure up to the realities of the host business environments. 
In the following section, we outline the background and rationale of Singapore’s regionalization strategy, to 
highlight the Singapore government’s strong interventionist style.  Thereafter, we detail the methodology of our 
field research, and present our findings and the preliminary inferences we draw from them.  The origins and 
progress of these industrial parks in China Vietnam and India are then presented; and with reference to our empirical 
findings we detail the factors which influenced the surveyed tenants to invest in their respective parks as well as the 
constraints they are currently facing.  Discussion then shifts to the socio-political and economic realities that stymie 
the parks’ progress. Finally, we present the implications of these experiences on Singapore’s regionalization policy. 
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Singapore’s Regionalization Stratagem 
It is of little doubt that since Singapore’s independence in 1965, her economy has grown phenomenally to become 
an important base for multinational manufacturing in the region. Singapore’s success can be attributed primarily to 
her government’s intervention and sound economic policies (Krause 1998; Findlay and Wellisz 1993).  The 
government has laid a foundation for a corruption-free administration throughout the years.  This, coupled with 
infrastructural efficiency and the overall integrity of its legal and financial systems, has played a central role in 
attracting foreign direct investments to fuel the city-state’s economic development (Mirza 1986; Rodan 1989; Huff 
1995). Rising business costs accruing from the higher standard of living and growing competition from emerging 
economies in the region prompted the state to intervene again through “economic re-engineering” in order for the 
island nation to maintain her competitive edge.  As such, the island's investment horizons were expanded through an 
overseas direct investment program (Wong and Ng 1991; Regnier 1993). 
 
The Singapore government’s role as a facilitator and partner is evident from the creation of Singapore-havens via 
industrial parks in neighboring countries and the restructuring of taxation policies (Singapore Ministry of Finance 
1993, SEDB 1993b).  The state also embarked on fostering trusted regional networks identical to those within its 
domestic market, whereby interlocking interests and perceived commonality of values crystallized a system of 
cooperative competition. Implicit in this stratagem was the government’s intent to draw on its state enterprise 
network (or, in local parlance, Singapore Inc.), and extend this network to facilitate business ventures in the region 
(SEDB 1995b, Yeung 1998, Zutshi and Gibbons 1998).  Theoretically, the ‘vested interests’ within the interlinked 
collaborative system should have served to expedite processes, garner exclusive incentives, and negate inept 
bureaucracy. 
 
The Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB) set out the main ideas of this strategy in a 1998 policy paper 
entitled “Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global Economy”.  Fresh insights were later added during the 1990 
Global Strategies Conference and the 1993 Regionalization Forum.  The “Singapore Unlimited and Regionalization 
2000” policy documents also encompassed Singapore’s strategy for accelerating the economic development in China, 
India, Indonesia and Vietnam. The prospering-thy-neighbor strategy was a major aspect of Singapore’s quest to expand 
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her economic space which was vital for sustaining economic growth.  This strategy to remain economically 
competitive in the global economy has been characterized by many as the building of platforms for national growth 
through the management of strategic alliances and ‘collaborations’ with private or semi-private enterprises on 
national economic projects (Rodan 1989, Huff 1995, Low 1998, Blomqvist 2001). 
 
Singapore’s strategy comprises a synergy of state intervention policies. There are three phases to encourage the 
involvement of the township.  In the incipient phase, political leaders negotiate the projects’ institutional framework 
that typically involves garnering special investment conditions in the host locations.  They also secure endorsement 
from host-country governments so as to provide the projects with the essential political patronage and protection to 
woo potential investors.  In the second phase, a government-selected consortium, typically comprising of Singapore 
government agencies and government-linked companies (GLCs), take on the role of primary investors in 
development of the parks. This is premised on the reluctance of private-sector firms to take on investments of such 
enormous scale that require a fair amount of time before hitting the breakeven.  Moreover, the high risk factor 
involved in venturing into a relatively undeveloped and unfamiliar locale, compounded to the uncertain political 
climate, renders it inherently unattractive to private enterprises.  In the final phase, the state actively markets these 
projects to Singapore-based multinational enterprises (MNEs), besides advocating the internationalization of 
Singapore companies.  The presence of government agencies and government-linked companies, acting as ‘business 
architects’ and ‘knowledge arbitrageurs’, also lends weight to these promotional efforts.  
 
Singapore’s economic regionalization and the initial concept of the SIJORI growth triangle has been much 
publicized (Lee and Kumar 1991, Parsonage 1992, Kumar and Siddique 1994, Grundy-Warr et al 1999).  This state-
led initiative was inaugurated with the launch of the Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) on the Indonesian Island of 
Batam (Perry and Yeoh 2000).  This success of this township prompted the Singapore government to use it as a 
model for other industrial developments in the region, and the state has since earned a reputation with regard to 
developing, supervising and marketing large-scale economic expansion projects (Yeoh and Wong 2005; Yeoh et al 
2005). 
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The following case studies of the industrial parks in China, Vietnam and India serve to illustrate the prevalence of 
the Singapore government’s role in developing, managing and marketing these huge overseas investments which can 
eventually become profitable ventures of their own. These strategic initiatives can also be seen as being an end in 
themselves - exporting Singapore’s trademark expertise in the development of industrial infrastructure to the rest of 
Asia.  
 
Industrial Townships in Asia: Development and Challenges 
Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) 
The Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) was Singapore’s flagship investment in Vietnam.  It was primarily 
formed in line with Singapore’s prosper-thy-neighbour policies to heighten the economic development of fellow 
Southeast Asian nations.  More importantly, the Vietnam model also served to replicate confidence in Singapore’s 
success in Indonesia, and, like BIP, VSIP were developed along the similar initiative of providing a low-cost 
industrial enclave for the manufacturing industry. 
 
VSIP was first mooted in by the then Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, and Singapore’s then Prime 
Minister, Goh Chok Tong, in 1994.  VSIP was envisaged to facilitate foreign investment that would fuel the 
industrialization and modernization of Vietnam.  The park’s development also tapped on Singapore’s expertise in 
the establishment of similar industrial townships in Indonesia and China; and was in line with Singapore’s foreign 
policy of aiding the economic development of countries in the region.  As such, the project received high level 
governmental support from both countries. 
 
The township was developed by a consortium of seven companies led by Singapore’s SembCorp Industries in a joint 
venture with Becamex, a Vietnamese state-owned enterprise.  Located 17km north of Ho Chi Minh City, in Binh 
Duong province, it is also in close proximity to the Tan Son Nhat International Airport and major sea ports.  A 
250,000-strong working population within a 15 km radius from VSIP provides a ready pool of low-cost, skilled 
labor.  The park boasts infrastructure such as uninterrupted power supply, water and waste treatment plants, 
telecommunications facilities, on top of various amenities which cater for the needs of the working population.  
Investors can also rely on a ‘hassle-free’, one-stop service’ and other park offices that facilitate administrative 
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procedures such as customs clearance and licensing.  Since its launch in 1996, the 500-hectre park has witnessed a 
steady increase in investors. 
 
Singapore made deliberate efforts to foster strong collaboration with the local authorities in VSIP.  A Management 
Board was set up, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Binh Duong Province People's Committee. The board is a 
full facilitation and on-site approving authority for various import-export and immigration permits for investments 
up to a value of 40 million, and also assists investors in the recruitment of personnel. 
 
VSIP’s first tenants included 3M, Sandoz, Sakata Inx, Godrej (India), Liwayway Food Industries, and a mix of 
Singapore manufacturers like ST Automotive and Star Chemicals.  It has a mixed tenant profile with firms 
participating in an array of industries such as food, electrical and electronics, consumer goods and light industries.  
The tenants originate mostly from Asian countries – Singaporean, Taiwanese and Japanese firms making the bulk of 
investors; with several Swiss, American and German companies also locating their operations in VSIP.  The total 
value of activities is currently estimated at over US$700 million.  Since the introduction of electronics 
manufacturing into the park, VSIP has seen a marked turnaround. VSIP first posted its profits in 2002, and its 
success has even spurred the development of a second industrial park, VSIP II. These 2 parks have attracted a total 
of 257 projects from 22 countries, created 40,000 jobs, and have total investment capital exceeding US$ 1.4 billion.  
 
Experienced and street-savvy developers from China, Taiwan and Thailand have attempted to replicate the 
Singapore model through the establishments of industrial estates around VSIP.  Townships such as the Linh Trung 
Export Processing Zone and the Tan Thuan Processing Zone seek to erode VSIP’s dominance in infrastructure 
though the provision of newer facilities and amenities.  At the same time, these competitor parks market themselves 
aggressively on price, charging lower transportation fees accruing from more strategic locations. 
 
The investments into VSIP were also envisioned to reap from the various political patronages that the park receives.  
These initial expectations in the spirit of ASEAN economic co-operation have proved insufficient to secure similar 
commitment in the lower tiers of government.  Also, the influence of local administrators, and their interests in 
competing developments, has compromised the significance of inter-governmental endorsement of the project.  Our 
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on-site interviews also reveal certain discomfort amongst the tenants with the Singapore styled control and 
management.  These have materialized in perception differences, protracted conflicts and project delays.  Although 
it has not blown into a major issue, it is without a doubt a growing one.  Nevertheless, SembCorp Industries has 
announced plans to divest itself part of its stake in VSIP to reflect a better alignment of interests, notwithstanding 
that the project is registering positive returns on its investment. 
 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) 
Whilst VSIP was developed to enhance ASEAN solidarity, the Chinese program was to be a trophy for the 
industrialization program, providing the litmus test to evaluate Singapore’s experience as a role model in the region 
as well as a source of diplomatic leverage with more populous nations.  This in turn also endorsed the perception of 
Singapore’s policy-makers that its reputation for an efficient and transparent administration could be marketed to the 
region. 
 
Singapore’s industrial township program was boosted following the then-Chinese Premier Deng Xiao Ping’s visit to 
Singapore, where he invited Singapore’s then-Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew to develop a model industrial 
township to test the ability to transplant Singapore’s strategies to China.  The project envisaged both infrastructure 
provision and the transfer of “software” associated with Singapore’s social and economic policies.   
 
CS-SIP was the flagship of the Chinese projects.  It was officially launched on May 12, 1994, and touted as a setting 
offering plentiful labor, and other local resources at competitive costs, and in proximity to target markets especially 
Shanghai.  These primary factors were ostensibly enhanced and strengthened by world-class infrastructure within 
the park, strong dedication and support from the local authorities, and increasing bilateral economic collaboration 
between China and Singapore. This project was a joint development by a consortium of Chinese and Singapore-
based investors - the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Company (CSSD). At the time, the 
Chinese partners held a 35 per cent stake, with the Singapore consortia holding 65 per cent. These two consortia 
retain separate identities and responsibilities, taking up projects according to their agreed roles (SIPAC 1999).  
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However, barely five years into the project, Singapore acknowledged that the original vision of transferring its 
industrial-development model to Suzhou was a more complex and challenging process than previously imagined.  
Singapore’s disappointment was pointedly highlighted by then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s public questioning 
of the commitment of the Chinese partners to the project. By early 1999, the township had attracted a resident 
population of only 5,000 against a target of 600,000.  Also, the park was employing 14,000 workers, in stark 
contrast to the original aim of 360,000. The slow progress resulted in financial losses for the Singapore-led 
consortium, which funded the land development and infrastructure, as well as for Singaporean investors involved in 
peripheral projects. Official estimates placed Singaporean investment in CS-SIP at only US$147 million.  
 
These protracted difficulties among others led to the 1999 announcement that Singapore would stop pouring in 
additional investments and instead would transfer majority ownership of the park to the Chinese partners.  The latter 
now holds a 65 per cent stake in this new alignment of interests.  CS-SIP’s declining performance made a U-turn 
within one year following the transfer of majority ownership and management control. Since then, the park has seen 
a strong influx of investment, especially from Japan. Investment in CS-SIP currently stands at US$16 billion, with 
75,000 jobs created. CS-SIP, named as one of nine “next frontier tech cities” of the world by Newsweek, has now 
established its position as an investment hub for high-tech industries. A significant proportion of the non-Asian 
tenants originate from the US and Europe, and over 70% of their investments are in electronics, information 
technology and other high-tech segments. The development for the entire site is scheduled for completion within the 
next two years. These next phases for construction of transportation networks and other infrastructure developments 
are at an estimated cost of US$10 billion. CSSD’s goal is to be listed in China and possibly in Singapore. 
 
Like VSIP, Singapore’s gambit in China was not spared fierce competition from neighbouring parks that sought to 
replicate its infrastructural dominance by upgrading their facilities as well as innovating on their management 
systems.  The simple economics of competition have marginalized the premium attached to the ‘superior 
infrastructure’ which was the selling point in all of Singapore’s industrial-investment enclaves.  Before control of 
CS-SIP has handed over to the Chinese partners, local officials chose to market the adjacent Suzhou New District 
over CS-SIP, arguably on the basis that they had greater ownership in this development.  Although this competition 
has somewhat subsided following the alignment of interests, CS-SIP continues to face competition from the nearby 
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Pudong New Area and China’s five special economic zones in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan.  It 
appears, prima facie, that the exclusive investment incentives offered to CS-SIP tenants may prove to only be a 
temporary advantage in the face of rapidly improving competition. 
 
Since 2001, control of the park has been handed over to the Chinese.  This includes the appointment of key officials, 
previously steering Suzhou New District, to leadership positions in CS-SIP.  The park’s managing board is currently 
jointly headed by Chinese Vice-Premier Madam Wu Yi and Singapore’s Prime Minster Mr Lee Hsien Loong.  Such 
realignment of interests has, at face value, resolved the ‘paradox of context’ (Thomas, 2001; Pereira, 2003) which 
encumbered the CS-SIP initiative. However, the level of Chinese political patronage for CS-SIP has yet to reach that 
of many of its competitors. 
 
International Tech Park, Bangalore (ITPB) 
In the early 1990s, India was experiencing an IT boom that was accompanied by a vast disposal of Information 
Technology (IT) related facilities and highly skilled professionals. Singapore was prompted to set up a technology 
park in Bangalore to capture its comparative advantage in the field of Information Technology.  
 
While Singapore’s models in Indonesia, Vietnam and China catered for activities under the “operations” sphere of 
the value chain such as manufacturing, ITPB provided Singapore with an exceptional set of advantages that blended 
low-cost and high-end activities simultaneously, such that companies could incorporate an assortment of value chain 
activities in one locality.  This advantage was further enhanced by location advantages – the availability of skilled 
and unskilled labor, abundant land resources as well as the cooperative and encouraging attitude of the Indian 
government, then under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) plus the Karnataka State Government.   
 
ITPB was first mooted as an idea to bring a Singapore-styled park to the Indian subcontinent by Mr. V.P. Narasimha 
Rao and Mr. Goh Chok Tong in 1992, who were the then-Prime Ministers of India and Singapore respectively.  The 
park, located 18 km from Bangalore in India’s “Silicon Valley”, was positioned as a forerunner for a new generation 
of Singapore-developed IT parks in India. Construction commenced in September 1994, and the park was officially 
inaugurated in 2000. This project was developed by a Singapore consortium led by Ascendas International, India’s 
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Tata Group and the Karnataka state government in a 40-40-20 arrangement. The state government has since reduced 
its stake to 6 percent.  On 11 April 2005, the Singapore Consortium bought over the stake previously held by Tata. 
 
ITPB was marketed as an environment that “cuts through the bureaucracy and bottlenecks which were distinct in 
India’s infrastructure and operating environment”. It has a futuristic design and comes complete with amenities and 
support services which includes residential apartments and penthouses. More importantly, ITPB guarantees 
uninterrupted power supply and telecommunication facilities, immediate-occupancy business incubator space, and 
provides the formulaic `one-stop’ service – features intended to heighten the park’s attractiveness to prospective 
tenants in the IT and high-tech industries. 
 
The first 39 tenants of ITPB began operations in 1999 and 2,000 jobs were created.  At present, ITPB is in Phase 1C 
of development, and houses 106 companies employing approximately 12,000 workers. Over 50 per cent of these 
tenants are wholly foreign–owned firms, including major global players such as AOL Member Services and IBM 
Global Services. More than 70 percent of tenants are involved in integrated circuit design, software development, 
precision technology and research and development. Thus, it seems that ITPB has already ensconced itself in the IT 
scene, in accordance with plans. 
 
ITPB’s success hinges on the “Singapore-styled design and management” reputation.  However, the premium placed 
on ITPB’s formulaic “one stop” service and self-sufficient infrastructure is similar and increasingly, eroded by 
intense competition from the newer parks being developed by street-savvy Indian entrepreneurs.  Some of these 
parks are even smaller in size.  Also, ITPB’s capacity to provide stable electricity is perhaps the only factor that 
differentiates it from similar parks such as the Software Technology Park and Electronics City in Bangalore.  Such 
competitor parks market themselves aggressively on price as in the case of Vietnam, charging significantly lower 
rentals for “no frills” factory space.  As a case in point, ITPB’s listed price is Rs50 (approximately US$1) per square 
foot, whereas the rate in other areas, and within Electronic City itself, is less than Rs15.  Our interviews with ITPB 
tenants have alluded to the possibility that the Park’s attractiveness may, in time, be eroded as more IT parks and 
companies are established within the vicinity to capitalize on the area’s repute, while offering lower rentals with 
reliable energy as the state develops. 
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Also, varying degrees of commitment and support by different state governments towards the country’s 
development can affect ITPB’s competitive advantage.  The lack of good supporting infrastructure in the 
surrounding environment and the disparity in local state-governments supporting different cities serve as a deterrent 
to investors, even as cities like Hyderabad, Mumbai and Chennai continue to advance technologically.  Additionally, 
corruption remains endemic and bureaucratic red tape is difficult to circumvent.  These considerations are by 
themselves deterrents to potential investors, even with Singapore’s presence and involvement.  To hedge 
Singapore’s strategic interests in India, Ascendas is reportedly partnering India’s largest construction conglomerate, 
Larsen and Tuobro, to build Cyber Pearl in Hyderabad’s Hitec City, while plans are in place to develop similar IT 
parks in other Indian cities on a turnkey basis. 
 
Field Research 
Analysis of the Singapore-styled parks, relying primarily on secondary data from official publications and press 
reports, is not enough to ascertain the situation on the ground. To obtain primary data from the tenants of parks, we 
applied the questionnaire developed in Yeoh et al (2000), and surveyed the case study parks on the differential 
impact of various pull factors on firms’ investment decisions, along with the differential impact of different types of 
constraints on their operations. 
 
Methodology: Questionnaire Survey 
The questionnaire was designed as a comparative study to investigate the various factors influencing firms' 
investment decisions along with the problems faced by their operations; specifically, to test tenants’ perception of 
the created variables meant to give the parks an advantage, as mentioned earlier in this paper, as well as measure 
said past perception against the current reality. The question sets for the tenants in the three industrial parks are 
similar. The surveys sought to highlight the different push/pull factors facing the park tenants when they chose to 
relocate their operations in the respective parks, and the operating constraints faced by the respective park tenants. 
The survey focused on three main areas. Firstly, the basic profile of the respondent: type of ownership, nature of 
operations, number of employees, sales turnover and its market orientation. Secondly, the factors that attracted the 
respondents to invest in the park. Data on various constraints was gathered in the third section.  
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Questionnaire surveys were conducted in Vietnam, China and India from July 2004 to July 2005. A total of 211 
responses were collected from tenant-firms: of these, 47 were located in VSIP, 33 in ITPB, and the remaining 131 in 
CS-SIP. In all cases, the surveyed tenants were carefully selected so as to obtain a representative distribution of all 
tenants in the park across both industry and nature of operations; to illustrate this distribution, the respondents were 
further reclassified in terms of type of ownership, nature of their operations, number of employees, and target 
markets. This profile is presented in Table 2. The surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews in the 
case-study parks lasting an average of 45-60 minutes, with staff in senior managerial positions or above present in 
all cases, to ensure the response of the selected tenants, and the holistic and accurate nature of the obtained 
responses. 
 
Logit Model 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the responses relating to factors and constraints, a 
logit model1 was applied to compare the perceived advantages influencing the tenants’ decision to locate in the case-
study parks. A similar model was also applied to the constraints faced by the tenants in these parks. The logit estimations 
are set out in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.  
 
Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decision to Locate in the Case-Study Parks  
                                                          
1
 The logit model, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the following form: 
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Where:   Pi is the probability of firm being located in the particular park 
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Where:   Fj = 1 if the factor j is selected, 0 otherwise  
  α0 = constant term 
  αj = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
Estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant, would suggest that the firm choosing that particular advantage/constraint is 
more likely to be a factor among tenants in that particular park than in those from the other industrial parks included in the survey. For example, 
where VSIP is the dependent variable, if the coefficient of F1 is positive and significant, this would suggest that, after taking into account the 
effects of other advantages, a firm choosing ‘Political commitment from the Singapore government’ has a higher probability of being a firm 
located in VSIP i.e. political commitment from the Singapore government was a significant pull factor for VSIP tenants, as opposed to tenants in 
ITPB or CS-SIP. 
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The development of Singapore’s overseas industrial townships carried with it 3 distinct features – the export of 
Singapore’s industrial development expertise; the presence of an appropriate source of labor in accordance to the 
park’s requirements; and lastly, and political endorsement from Singapore and host country governments in lending 
credibility to the projects.  Not surprisingly, our empirical findings have reflected these 3 hallmarks to various 
extents.  Of the tenants surveyed in all 3 parks, reliable infrastructure was the most frequently cited factor which 
induced them to invest in their respective parks.  Also, investment incentives due to the various political patronages 
played an important role in attracting investors (rank 2 in VSIP and ITPB, rank 1 in SIP). 
 
After handing over the majority stake to the Chinese consortium, it was no surprise that tenants in SIP rated political 
commitment from the host government more importantly vis-à-vis VSIP and ITPB, as evident from a positive and 
significant (α = 1.117).  Accordingly, political commitment from the Singapore government was ranked last by SIP 
respondents.  On the other hand, with the Singapore government playing a relatively larger role in VSIP, tenants 
were less concerned about the Vietnamese government’s level of support, as indicated by a negative and significant 
(α = -1.006).  The presence of a large educated population in cities around Suzhou also proved to be a lure for 
investors to SIP with respect to VSIP and ITPB.  This is shown by a positive and significant (α = 1.228).  Also, 
conducive labor relations were relatively more crucial for SIP investors as compared to the other 2 parks.  This is as 
seen from a positive and significant (α = 2.317). 
 
Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations 
As in the case of China, ITPB respondents do not face a shortage of professionals and managers due to the 
abundance of educated labor in the subcontinent.  This is indicated by a negative a significant (ß = -1.822).  On the 
flipside, this constraint is severe in VSIP where investors also face a lack of personnel capable of conducting 
research and development, as evident from a positive and significant (ß = 1.398). 
 
From our results, we also ascertain that despite a rise in competitor parks around these townships, tenants are more 
concerned about competition stemming from overseas industrial parks  This is as indicated by the positive and 
significant (ß = 1.262) and (ß = 1.223) for VSIP and SIP respondents respectively.  Also, ITPB respondents rate 
competition from domestic industrial parks as less of a concern vis-à-vis the other 2 parks as shown from a negative 
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and significant (ß = -1.714).  This is contrary to popular belief that competitor parks in the vicinity of these 
townships pose the biggest threat. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
The progress of Singapore’s overseas parks over a comparatively short period of time indicates the ability of the 
Singapore’s state enterprise network to mobilize economic and political resources to create economic space to 
maintain her economic competitiveness. These projects have obtained special investment conditions within their 
overseas localities, with government endorsements that further underscoring its significance.  Our empirical findings 
also suggest that the Singapore developed townships are able to withstand the economics of competition from rival 
parks springing up in their vicinity.  Nevertheless, we assert that certain complexities of the individual environments 
may have eroded some of the park’s conduciveness for investments. 
 
In Vietnam, the additional agenda vis-à-vis CS-SIP and ITPB is that the host nation is a fellow member of ASEAN, 
and promoting economic development in VSIP is only one prong of Singapore’s prosper-thy-neighbour policies.  It 
is envisioned that in the process of technological transfer, Vietnam would emerge from its war torn past to become a 
strong inviter of foreign investment into Southeast Asia.  This is apparent from the mix of ‘targeted’ industries as 
well as the style of park management and operations. Not withstanding such objectives, we submit that the economy 
has yet been able to produce the necessary talent required to take the Vietnamese economy as a whole on the next 
rung on the ladder of development.  Besides the tight labor market, competition from industrial parks overseas 
places growing pressure on the park and its tenants. Nonetheless, the park’s competitiveness, while dented, is yet 
intact, and remains a draw to potential tenants. 
 
In China, CS-SIP can be perceived as a strategic thrust by the Singapore government to capitalize upon first-mover 
advantages in a regional economy with immense market potential. As the first entrant to develop and manage a 
state-of-the-art industrial park, CS-SIP could arguably enhance Singapore’s reputation for infrastructure efficiency 
and corrupt-free administration. More subtly, its apparent success would leverage various Singapore companies’ 
foray into leverage Singaporean companies’ foray into China’s aggressive infrastructure plans and commercial-
residential township projects. Following the handover to the Chinese partners, CS-SIP has indeed been doing very 
well for itself, as can be seen both from its ‘paper results’, and from the upbeat tone of the respondents from the 
park. However, the parks management should not be overly complacent with the results so far, given the waves of 
competition arising locally and externally. 
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In India, ITPB has arguably experienced success in capitalizing on first-mover advantages in a regional economy 
with immense market potential. More subtly, its apparent success has leveraged various Singapore companies’ foray 
into the Indian IT industry.  Despite facing fierce competition with only its stable electricity supply as the main draw 
for investors, our empirical findings have suggested that the park is still able to maintain its lead in the near future.  
However, just as the case of CS-SIP, the apparent success of ITPB should not be overestimated, but take into 
account various socio-political issues stemming from the Indian economy as a whole such as bureaucratic red tape 
and rampant corruption. 
 
To summarize our study, we suggest that the underlying theories for Singapore’s regionalization stratagem, location 
advantages present and the strategic advantage created for firms within these industrial-townships have reaped 
undoubtedly tangible and remarkable results.  However, such location advantages can benefit both firms within and 
outside the Singapore-styled parks; plus CS-SIP, VSIP and ITPB do not have a sustainable competitive or strategic 
advantage over their competition.  This paper hence contends that Singapore’s calculated and schematized efforts at 
transborder industrialization, though in concert with regional governments and business elites, have resulted in 
aberrances from expectations as they are more often than not frustrated by the intricacies of socio-political and 
economic realities in these foreign economies.   
 
Despite the varying economic conditions faced by the various townships, the Singapore government is still 
committed to re-engineer such economic space through regionalization in various countries in the region.  The 
Singapore’s state-enterprise networks are also constantly in search for alternative strategies to enforce these efforts 
to sustain our economy.  In this course of looking for alternative sites, we suggest that the Singapore government 
note that the potential host countries’ socio-political milieu will always be in a constant state of change for years to 
come.  To enable the Singapore model to be successfully exported, lessons learnt from these ventures in China, 
Vietnam and India have to be applied in future economic planning and development policies. 
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TABLE 1 
 
 Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decisions to Invest in VSIP, ITPB and SIP 
 
 
 VSIP ITPB SIP 
Variables Frequency Rank α coeff. p-value Frequency Rank α coeff. p-value Frequency Rank α coeff. p-value 
Political commitment from the 
Singapore government 6 7 0.441 0.492 6 5 0.139 0.86 11 11 -0.579 0.348 
Political commitment from the 
host government 14 4 -1.006 0.024** 6 5 -0.709 0.232 71 3 1.117 0.005*** 
Investment Incentives 23 2 -0.06 0.896 14 2 -0.588 0.305 83 1 0.353 0.391 
Efficient host government 
institutions 9 6 1.056 0.081* 3 7 -0.423 0.593 21 8 -0.709 0.202 
Competitive overheads 6 7 -1.358 0.071* 2 8 0.39 0.689 21 8 0.927 0.15 
Reliable Infrastructure 28 1 0.021 0.963 27 1 0.684 0.278 83 1 -0.365 0.374 
Competitive labor costs 19 3 0.819 0.105 1 11 -2.69 0.017** 35 5 0.258 0.591 
Conducive industrial relations 4 9 -1.486 0.030** 2 8 -2.287 0.039** 33 6 2.317 0.0005*** 
Availability of skilled/educated 
labor 11 5 -0.934 0.063* 12 3 -0.716 0.209 62 4 1.228 0.006*** 
Good work ethics 4 9 -0.741 0.255 12 3 0.632 0.289 26 7 -0.152 0.774 
Presence of major suppliers 2 11 -0.983 0.032** 2 8 -0.896 0.154 20 10 1.178 0.004*** 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey 
 
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
TABLE 2 
 
  Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations in VSIP, ITPB and SIP  
 
 
 VSIP ITPB SIP 
Labor constraints Frequency Rank 
ß 
coeff. p-value Frequency Rank ß coeff. p-value Frequency Rank ß coeff. p-value 
Shortage of professionals and 
managers 32 1 0.658 0.066* 4 4 -1.822 0.005*** 50 4 0.141 0.644 
Shortage of R&D personnel 19 4 1.398 0.0005*** 3 7 -1.333 0.023** 40 6 -0.578 0.057* 
Rising labor costs 6 9 0.466 0.209 7 3 -1.168 0.076* 47 5 0.027 0.933 
                          
Organizational constraints                         
Difficulty in obtaining capital 
equipments 9 7 -0.159 0.77 3 8 -0.215 0.786 20 10 0.224 0.645 
Lack of good supporting services 15 6 0.107 0.814 4 4 -0.633 0.416 40 6 0.141 0.739 
Difficulty in securing funds for 
expansion 5 10 0.232 0.531 2 10 -0.605 0.302 37 8 0.044 0.898 
High and/or rising overhead 
costs 18 5 -1.023 0.047** 16 1 -0.989 0.201 63 3 1.162 0.010** 
Environmental constraints                         
Impact of host government 
regulations 22 2 -0.205 0.586 8 2 0.969 0.051* 24 9 -0.322 0.356 
Competition from overseas 
industrial parks 22 2 1.262 0.001*** 4 4 0.093 0.861 72 1 1.223 0.001*** 
Competition from domestic 
industrial parks 8 8 0.166 0.658 3 9 -1.714 0.009*** 68 2 0.566 0.104 
Reduced involvement from 
Singapore government 4 11 -1.287 0.005*** 0 11 -1.91 0.015** 0 11 -1.742 0.0005*** 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey 
 
*** Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
 
